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In his last works, John Rawls explicitly argued for an overlapping consensus on a 
family of reasonable liberal political conceptions of justice, rather than just one. This 
‘Deep Version’ of political liberalism opens up new questions about the relationship 
between citizens’ political conceptions, from which they must draw and offer public 
reasons in their political advocacy, and their comprehensive doctrines. These questions 
centre on whether a reasonable citizen’s choice of political conception can be 
influenced by her comprehensive doctrine. In this paper I present two models of the 
relationship, which give contrasting answers to these questions, and defend the model 
that is more permissive with regard to the influence of comprehensive doctrines. This 
has important implications for our understanding of Rawlsian political liberalism, and 
reduces the force of objections that have been offered by theorists sympathetic to 
religion. 
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Many objections to John Rawls’s political liberalism have come from theorists sympathetic to 
religion. Their central complaint is that Rawls’s view is incompatible with living a 
‘religiously integrated life’ (Wolterstorff 1997).1 Whether this objection is valid turns in part 
on the precise relation between citizens’ political conceptions of justice, from which they 
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draw and offer public reasons to justify their advocacy of, and votes for, laws relating to 
fundamental political questions,
2
 and their comprehensive doctrines (including their religious 
beliefs). That relationship is the focus of this paper. I present two models of the relationship 
within what Gerald Gaus (2014) calls the ‘Deep Version’ of Rawlsian political liberalism, 
and defend the model that is more permissive with regard to the influence of comprehensive 
doctrines. 
 The Deep Version of political liberalism recognises reasonable pluralism about 
justice, not merely about the good. There is a ‘family’ of reasonable political conceptions of 
justice, with different (reasonable) citizens accepting different members of that family. This 
raises the question that is the focus of this paper: can citizens’ comprehensive doctrines 
permissibly influence their choice of political conception? For example, a Catholic citizen 
who believes that only men can be priests might on this basis reject any political conception 
that favours laws prohibiting male-only priesthoods. Similarly, a citizen who endorses 
liberation theology, so believes that God has a preferential concern for the poor, might on this 
basis endorse a political conception that calls for very high levels of redistribution. The 
Permissive Model, as I call it, allows this. Citizens can choose their political conception of 
justice in light of their comprehensive doctrine. According to the Restrictive Model, however, 
this undermines the freestandingness of citizens’ political conceptions, stymies political 
deliberation, and allows laws to be unacceptably shaped by comprehensive doctrines. 
Citizens should develop their political conceptions in a freestanding way, insulated from the 
influence of their comprehensive doctrines. 
 I will argue that the Permissive Model is compatible with the core tenets of Rawlsian 
political liberalism and makes possible a more effective response to some of political 
liberalism’s critics. 
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 The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section I review the basic features of 
Rawlsian political liberalism, to show how our question arises. I then explain the Restrictive 
and Permissive Models in detail. Next, I consider five objections to the Permissive Model. 
Each of these objections draws on some central value or purpose of Rawlsian political 
liberalism. I argue that the Permissive Model can be defended from these objections. Finally, 
I present two further considerations in favour of the Permissive Model, which give Rawlsian 




Setting out the question: basic elements of the Rawlsian picture 
Gaus has recently distinguished between the ‘Shallow’ and ‘Deep’ Versions of political 
liberalism. According to the former, there is reasonable pluralism about the good, due to the 
burdens of judgment, which are the ‘many hazards involved in the correct (and conscientious) 
exercise of our powers of reason and judgment’ (p. 56).4 These include the facts that evidence 
is conflicting and complex, that values can be weighed in different ways, that concepts are 
vague, that our assessment of evidence is shaped by our total life experiences, and that 
different normative considerations often conflict (pp. 56-57). For these reasons, the exercise 
of reason under free institutions leads to deep and irreconcilable disagreements over 
questions of the good, such that citizens endorse a great diversity of comprehensive 
doctrines.
5
 The Shallow Version of political liberalism seeks to show that an overlapping 
consensus on a shared political conception of justice is nonetheless possible among all 
reasonable citizens. 
 Citizens are conceived as accepting two sets of values, a political set and a non-
political set.
6
 While reasonable pluralism infects the non-political set, leading citizens to 
accept a variety of comprehensive doctrines, all reasonable citizens can come to share the 
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same account of the political set, so share a conception of justice. ‘Citizens’ overall views 
have two parts: one part can be seen to be, or coincide with, the publicly recognised political 
conception of justice; the other part is a (fully or partially) comprehensive doctrine to which 
the political conception is in some manner related’ (p. 38). Some reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines provide support for the political conception, others are congruent with it, and still 
others at least avoid direct conflict with it (p. 140).
7
 We thereby achieve a stable and well-
ordered liberal society, where ‘everyone accepts, and knows that everyone else accepts, the 
very same principles of justice’ (p. 35). The political set of values is itself derived from ideas 
implicit in the public political culture of liberal societies, particularly the idea ‘of society as a 
fair system of social cooperation between free and equal persons’ (p. 9). The shared political 
conception interprets and orders the political values contained within this ‘fundamental 
organising idea’ (p. 9). 
 The Deep Version of political liberalism recognises that the burdens of judgment also 
affect citizens’ beliefs about justice. There is reasonable pluralism about the right, not merely 
the good. There is no uniquely reasonable way to interpret and weigh the values contained 
within the political set. Instead, ‘there are different and incompatible liberal political 
conceptions’ (p. xlvii) that are nonetheless reasonable. Rawls calls this the ‘family of 
reasonable liberal conceptions of justice’ (pp. xlviii, 450). The content of public reason is 
given by this family of conceptions (p. 453). The Deep Version therefore ‘does not try to fix 
public reason once and for all in the form of one favoured political conception of justice’ (p. 
451). 
 Rawls outlines six criteria that a conception of justice must fulfil in order to qualify as 
a reasonable political conception. In order to be reasonable it must include what Jonathan 
Quong (2011, pp. 175-180) calls the ‘three general liberal principles’: ‘first, a specification of 
certain rights, liberties, and opportunities (of a kind familiar from democratic regimes); 
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second, a special priority of these freedoms; and third, measures assuring all citizens, 
whatever their social position, adequate all-purpose means to make intelligent and effective 
use of their liberties and opportunities’ (p. xlvi, cf. 450).8 
 In order for a conception to ‘fall under the category of the political’ (p. 452), it must 
be the case that its ‘principles apply to basic political and social institutions’, that it ‘can be 
presented independently from comprehensive doctrines of any kind’ (so is ‘freestanding’), 
and that it ‘can be worked out from fundamental ideas seen as implicit in the public political 
culture of a constitutional regime, such as the conceptions of citizens as free and equal 
persons, and of society as a fair system of cooperation’ (p. 453). Conceptions with these three 
features contain only political values and apply only to political life, so do not directly 
compete with the non-political values of comprehensive doctrines. Being freestanding also 
means that a conception is not ineliminably tied to any one comprehensive doctrine, so 
citizens holding to different doctrines can accept it. 
 There is therefore a bounded set of reasonable political conceptions of justice, {C1, 
C2,..., Cn}. Each conception interprets and orders shared political values in a different way. 
Given the range of possible interpretations and relative weights of political values this will be 
a large set, but it will nonetheless be limited, since every conception must have the six 
features that Rawls lists. This is necessary because reasonable political conceptions must be 
ones that all citizens can be reasonably expected to recognise as reasonable (p. 446). This is 
an implication of the criterion of reciprocity, which states that citizens must be prepared to 
offer one another fair terms of social cooperation, where fair terms are understood as ones 
that the citizen offering them can ‘reasonably think that those citizens to whom such terms 
are offered might also reasonably accept’ (p. xlii, cf. 446). Citizens who base their political 
action on a reasonable political conception fulfil this criterion, and thus offer one another 
public reasons, fulfilling their ‘duty of civility’ (pp. 444-447). 
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 According to the Deep Version, the overlapping consensus is therefore on the family 
of reasonable political conceptions of justice (p. 164). All the members of this family are 
recognised as reasonable by every reasonable citizen, but each citizen personally endorses 
one member of the family, which they take to be the most reasonable conception.
9
 When all 
reasonable citizens base their political advocacy on such a conception, the reciprocity 
condition is fulfilled, political legitimacy is achieved,
10
 and a stable political order is 
established. 
 Citizens also seek to integrate their political conception, their political set of values, 
with their comprehensive doctrine, their non-political set, as a module within that broader 
worldview. It is left to individual citizens to work out how to do this, and what adjustments 
need to be made to their overall view in order to make it possible. 
 One aspect of the Deep Version that is as yet unclear, however, is what influence, if 
any, citizens’ comprehensive doctrines can have upon their political conception. Are citizens 
permitted to shape their conception of justice to enable it to fit with their comprehensive 
doctrine? To put the question another way, can a citizen choose her political conception from 
set {C1, C2,..., Cn} based upon which is most consistent with her comprehensive doctrine? 
For instance, can she look at the policy implications of various conceptions and then choose 
the one that fits best with the policy views she derives from her comprehensive doctrine? Or 
must she work up her conception of justice without any reference to her comprehensive 
doctrine, bracketing out its influence at this stage in her reasoning? 
 The next section presents two models of the relationship between citizens’ political 
and non-political sets of values, which give contrasting answers to these questions. 
Two models of the relationship between comprehensive doctrines and political 
conceptions 
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The restrictive model 
According to the Restrictive Model, each citizen must deliberate about the interpretation and 
ordering of political values, and come to endorse a reasonable political conception of justice, 
independently of her comprehensive doctrine. Reasonable citizens recognise that their 
political conception must be able to be justified independently from their comprehensive 
doctrine, so that it provides reasons for laws that all can appreciate as having normative force. 
They thus develop their political conception in a freestanding way, before seeking to situate it 
within their broader worldview. When they reject one conception of justice in favour of 
another, therefore, they do so on the basis of reasons internal to the political set, rather than 
on the basis of non-political values. They accept a reasonable political conception, and reject 
other such conceptions, on the basis of public reasons – reasons that all citizens can 
reasonably be expected to endorse.
11
 
The permissive model 
According to the Permissive Model, comprehensive doctrines can influence citizens’ 
reasoning about which political conception they consider most reasonable. While citizens 
must base their political advocacy and votes on a political conception of justice, and so offer 
public reasons for laws, their choice of that particular political conception over the 
alternatives can be partly based upon their comprehensive doctrine. The process of bringing 
their political set and non-political set of values into congruence with one another is not 
simply a case of accommodating the latter to an understanding of the former that they 
developed in a freestanding way. Instead, their non-political values can influence their 
understanding of political values. When considering competing interpretations of political 
values, and different ways they can be prioritised and weighed in relation to one another, 
citizens are permitted to consider insights and arguments drawn from their comprehensive 
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doctrine. If a citizen finds that her comprehensive doctrine is incompatible with a particular 
political conception, C1, then she is permitted to reject C1. Similarly, her comprehensive 
doctrine might seem particularly well-matched to C2, and she is permitted to embrace C2 on 
that basis. 
What the models share 
Both models function within the Deep Version of Rawlsian political liberalism. They 
therefore share four vital features. 
 First, they share a conception of reasonableness. Both follow Rawls’s definition of the 
beliefs that a citizen must hold in order to be reasonable (see pp. 48-58) and of the features 
that a conception of justice must have in order to be a reasonable political conception (which 
I outlined above). 
 Second, both models require citizens to endorse a complete political conception of 
justice (pp. 454-455). Citizens’ political conceptions must contain a complete account of the 
various political values, and be applied consistently across different political questions. 
Completeness means that citizens can draw conclusions on (nearly) all fundamental political 
questions by sole reference to their political conception, and should support or oppose laws 
on this basis – on the basis of the public reasons provided by their political conception. 
 This prevents citizens from drawing on public reasons in an ad hoc way. Without a 
complete conception of justice, a citizen might form her views on each political question by 
consulting her religious doctrine, and then appeal in her public advocacy to whatever public 
reasons happen to support her positions. Rawls is opposed to this. 
 One problem with ‘ad hoc reasoning’ is that it can lead to inconsistent uses of 
political values. Jane believes that her religion supports law L1, which restricts freedom in 
some way, and appeals to security, a political value, in order to provide public reasons for her 
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position. She opposes law L2, also on the basis of her religious views, despite L2 restricting 
(similar amounts of) freedom for the sake of (similar amounts of) security. In her public 
advocacy against L2, Jane plays down the importance of security and emphasises the 
importance of freedom, in order to publicly justify her religiously-determined position. If 
Jane endorsed a complete political conception and applied it consistently across the range of 
fundamental political questions, she would be forced to choose to either support or oppose 
both of L1 and L2. Instead, she draws on public reasons in an inconsistent way in order to 
support positions she holds due to her religious beliefs. This is impermissible. 
 In some cases, of course, this kind of inconsistency might not arise. Citizens might 
find that they can form their views on particular issues by consulting their comprehensive 
doctrine, while appealing to public reasons in a fairly consistent way when providing public 
justifications for these positions. At the limit, they might implicitly affirm a complete 
political conception. Nonetheless, unless they form a complete conception of justice and use 
it consistently in their consideration of political questions, both models consider citizens to be 
violating the ideal of public reason. They are failing to guide their conduct by the ideal of 
offering terms of cooperation they can reasonably expect others to endorse. 
 The third similarity between the two models is that they follow Rawls’s ‘wide view’ 
of public reason. Citizens may permissibly appeal to their comprehensive doctrines to support 
their political positions, subject to the proviso that they offer sufficient public reasons in due 
course (pp. 462-464). Offering non-public reasons alongside public ones might even have 
beneficial effects, since it shows other citizens how one’s comprehensive doctrine and 
political conception cohere, so reassures them that one is reasonable and sincere in one’s 
public justifications (Boettcher 2005, p. 130). 
 The desire for citizens’ comprehensive doctrines and political conceptions to cohere is 
the final thing the models share. Citizens are not called to compartmentalise their lives and 
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ignore their comprehensive doctrines when they enter the political sphere. Their conception 
of justice should be distinct from their comprehensive doctrine, yet consistent with it. Even 
on the Restrictive Model, citizens should accommodate their political conception within their 
broader worldview. 
How the models differ 
The disagreement between the models concerns precisely how this coherence between 
political conceptions and comprehensive doctrines comes about. 
 On the Restrictive Model, citizens choose a conception of justice based on 
freestanding arguments for particular interpretations and orderings of political values. The 
considerations that lead a citizen to endorse a particular conception of justice should not 
depend upon her comprehensive doctrine for their validity, but should themselves be public 
reasons. Citizens then accommodate their political conception within their comprehensive 
doctrine as a second stage, and any adjustments they make must be to their comprehensive 
doctrine and not to their political conception.
12
 
 The Restrictive Model does allow citizens to see their comprehensive doctrine as 
providing the ‘ultimate grounding’ for their political conception. Citizens might believe that 
their comprehensive doctrine provides the true account of why they ought to be reasonable, 
and so ought to endorse the ideal of public reason and support laws by appeal to political 
values. But, according to the Restrictive Model, the reasons for a citizen’s endorsement of 
this particular political conception, rather than a different member of the family of 
reasonable conceptions, should not be comprehensive. Comprehensive doctrines should not 
influence citizens in their choice of political conception. A citizen’s determination of which 
political conception they believe to be the most reasonable should instead be based on 
reasons internal to the political set. 
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 On the Permissive Model, coherence between one’s political conception and 
comprehensive doctrine comes more directly, since the former is worked out with the latter in 
view, drawing on reasons that the latter provides. One’s reasoning about political values 
might still lead to amendments in one’s understanding of non-political values, but 
adjustments can also go the other way. One can accept or reject a certain interpretation or 
weighing of political values on the basis of comprehensive considerations. 
 The difference between the models, therefore, concerns the considerations that 
citizens are permitted to draw on when determining which political conception of justice in 
set {C1, C2,..., Cn} they believe is most reasonable. 
 To make things clearer, consider the case of Betty. As an orthodox Catholic, Betty 
believes that only men can be priests. Assume that some reasonable political conceptions 
endorse laws that prohibit male-only priesthoods, on equality grounds, while other reasonable 
conceptions weigh the value of freedom of association more highly, so permit such 
priesthoods.
13
 Betty has a theological objection to laws prohibiting male-only priesthoods, 
and for that reason will not endorse any political conception that favours such laws. She 
believes that those conceptions allow equality to outweigh freedom of association too easily. 
She rejects conception C1 on this basis. Betty ultimately comes to accept a complete, 
reasonable political conception, C2, that permits male-only priesthoods. She bases her 
political advocacy on this conception, so offers public reasons for (and against) laws (on this 
issue, and more generally). 
 We should be clear that Betty accepts and is motivated by the ideal of public reason. 
She believes that she must offer her compatriots reasons that she can reasonably expect them 
to accept. She recognises that reasonable pluralism means that no religious reasons fulfil this 
criterion, and that she must form a reasonable political conception and base her political 
advocacy upon it. This is why she engages in the process of reasoning that leads her to 
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endorse C2. Further, she does not engage in ‘ad hoc reasoning’, drawing on whatever public 
reasons support her comprehensively-based view on each political issue. She accepts and acts 
upon a complete, reasonable, political conception. She also is ready to abandon 
comprehensively-based considered convictions that are incompatible with C2. Her 
endorsement of C2, however, is in part based upon reasons drawn from her Catholicism. 
 Advocates of the Restrictive Model consider this impermissible, and believe that 
Betty’s comprehensive doctrine has an unacceptable level of influence over her political 
conception. This claim can be fleshed out in several different ways, drawing on different 
aspects of Rawlsian political liberalism. One might argue that the Permissive Model violates 
freestandingness, that it allows political conceptions to be ‘puppets’ for comprehensive 
doctrines, that it undermines political deliberation, that it permits insincerity, or that it 
violates the duty of civility and leads to illegitimate political outcomes. I respond to these 
objections in turn in the next section. 
Defending the Permissive Model 
Freestandingness 
Throughout Political Liberalism Rawls emphasises that political conceptions must be 
‘presented independently from comprehensive doctrines of any kind’ (p. 453). Conceptions 
that satisfy this criterion are ‘freestanding’: ‘a political conception of justice is what I call 
freestanding when it is not presented as derived from, or as part of, a comprehensive 
doctrine’ (p. xlii). While citizens should relate their political conception to their 
comprehensive doctrine, the former is ‘presented as freestanding and expounded apart from, 
or without reference to, any such wider background’ (p. 12). Political conceptions are 
accounts of political values only, and apply only to the basic structure. They are not tied to 
any specific metaphysical or epistemological doctrines, and must be worked up from ideas 
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implicit in the public political culture of liberal society. 
 This might seem to imply the Restrictive Model. Citizens’ political conceptions are 
only freestanding if they have not accepted them based directly on their comprehensive 
doctrine. That doctrine must not have been determinative in their favouring one political 
conception over another. Betty’s conduct in the above example is a violation of 
freestandingness, and so is impermissible. 
 It is not clear that this is what Rawls has in mind, however. Whenever he talks about 
political conceptions being freestanding he says it means that they must be capable of being 
presented as independent from any comprehensive doctrine. In other words, it must be 
possible to show that the conception contains a reasonable interpretation and balance of 
political values, taking only those values into account. All citizens can recognise the 
conception as reasonable. This shows that it has a ‘pro tanto justification’ (p. 386). 
 This does not necessarily have restrictive implications for the basis on which 
individual citizens endorse a political conception, or choose it in favour of the alternatives. C2 
can be capable of presentation independent of Betty’s comprehensive doctrine even though 
part of her reason for preferring C2 to C1 is that the former is more compatible with that 
doctrine. C2 is freestanding so long as it can be justified independently of Betty’s doctrine, 
and so be seen as a reasonable understanding of political values by all reasonable citizens. 
This can be the case even if Betty’s own reasons for endorsing this particular conception 
include comprehensive ones. Betty’s choice is partly based on her comprehensive beliefs, but 
nonetheless the conception she endorses is freestanding, because it ‘can be presented without 
saying, or knowing, or hazarding a conjecture about, what [comprehensive] doctrines it may 
belong to, or be supported by’ (pp. 12-13). 
 C2 is freestanding because one can argue that it is a reasonable understanding of the 
set of political values without appealing to any particular comprehensive doctrine. On the 
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issue of male-only priesthoods, for example, it seems reasonable to argue that female citizens 
can have adequate opportunities and liberties in a society where some voluntary associations 
exclude them from certain positions of leadership. Further, male-only priesthoods do not 
deny women’s equal political status, so are not incompatible with their free and equal 
citizenship. Given the importance of citizens being free to pursue their conception of the 
good, the state should not coercively interfere with the internal workings of voluntary 
associations, as long as basic liberties or opportunities are not being denied.
14
 
 Some citizens will be unconvinced by this argument; they might believe that 
discriminatory employment practices deny women equal status in a way that cannot be 
overridden by the value of free association, and therefore male-only priesthoods should be 
legally prohibited. Presumably those who hold to C1 believe this. Nonetheless, all can 
recognise that C2 contains a reasonable interpretation and ordering of political values, and 
that it can be presented independently of any particular comprehensive doctrine. Indeed, 
citizens who do not have any comprehensive reasons to favour male-only priesthoods can 
believe that they should nonetheless be permitted, and so endorse C2.
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 In this sense, C2 has a 
freestanding justification. This is sufficient for it to be a freestanding political conception, 
even if some citizens who endorse it, such as Betty, do so partly on the basis of their 
comprehensive doctrine. 
 This fits with Rawls’s discussion in Lecture 4, Section 8: ‘Conception and Doctrines: 
How Related?’ (pp. 168-172), where he considers various ways that reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines can be related to a political conception. One example involves a 
citizen who accepts Kantian moral philosophy. ‘From within his view’, Rawls writes, ‘the 
political conception... can, let us say, be derived’. This citizen regards Kantian philosophy ‘as 
the deductive basis of the political conception’ (p. 169). Yet freestandingness is not violated. 
The political conception is still capable of being presented independently of any 
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comprehensive doctrine, even though from within the viewpoint of this citizen it is derived 
from, and continuous with, Kantianism. This supports my argument that the Permissive 
Model is consistent with freestandingness. 
 Even on the Permissive Model, citizens must know that their political conceptions are 
freestanding, and so be able to present their understanding of political values without appeal 
to their comprehensive doctrine. In other words, they must know that their political 
conceptions have a freestanding justification and must endorse that justification. Reasonable 
citizens are motivated by the ideal of public reason, and so believe they must offer others 
reasons for laws that those others can reasonably be expected to endorse, which requires that 
the political conception they draw from has a freestanding justification and thus can be seen 
as reasonable by all citizens. Betty must endorse the freestanding justification for C2, and 
indeed can present this to others as an argument in favour of C2.
16
 She can argue that C2’s 
weighting of freedom of association as against equality is reasonable without appealing to her 
Catholicism, as I did above. This is sufficient for freestandingness. The fact that Betty’s own 
reasoning for C2 relied on her comprehensive doctrine does not prevent that conception from 
being freestanding. A political conception can be freestanding even if (some of) an individual 
citizen’s reasons for believing it to be the most reasonable conception are not. 
The puppet worry 
Rawls might be read as ruling out the Permissive Model within his discussion of 
completeness in ‘The Idea of Public Reason Revisited’.17 Rawls writes that 
‘the ordering of [political] values is made in light of their structure and features within 
the political conception itself, and not primarily from how they occur within citizens’ 
comprehensive doctrines. Political values are not to be ordered by viewing them 
separately and detached from one another or from any definite context. They are not 
puppets manipulated from behind the scenes by comprehensive doctrines’ (p. 454). 
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This suggests that the way political values are interpreted and ordered within one’s political 
conception must be decided based on public reasons, rather than on what fits best with one’s 
comprehensive doctrine. Citizens must endorse a particular political conception based on 
freestanding reasoning, independently from comprehensive considerations. Betty is allowing 
her political conception to be a ‘puppet’, controlled by her comprehensive doctrine, and this 
is impermissible. 
 This passage is not in fact incompatible with the Permissive Model, however. Rawls 
says that the ordering of political values is not made ‘primarily’ based on comprehensive 
considerations, suggesting that such considerations can have some influence on the shape of 
one’s political conception. He then notes that ‘the ordering is not distorted by those doctrines 
provided that public reason sees the ordering as reasonable’ (p. 454), and emphasises that 
reasonableness is the only test for distortion. As long as a citizen accepts a political 
conception that is within the family of reasonable conceptions we cannot say that her 
comprehensive doctrine has distorted that conception, even if comprehensive considerations 
have guided her selection of it. This leaves plenty of room for the Permissive Model. 
 Further, Rawls’s primary concern here is that political conceptions are complete, so 
are frameworks of thought giving reasonable judgments on every fundamental political 
question. This prevents citizens from reasoning in an ad hoc way, simply finding public 
reasons that support whatever policies their comprehensive doctrine endorses. As we saw 
earlier, both models view this as impermissible. Rawls’s next paragraph shows that this is his 
focus: 
‘What we cannot do in public reason is to proceed directly from our comprehensive 
doctrine, or a part thereof, to one or several political principles and values, and the 
particular institutions they support. Instead we are required to first work to the basic 
ideas of a complete political conception and from there to elaborate its principles and 
ideals, and to use the arguments they provide’ (p. 455). 
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The Permissive Model concurs. Citizens should first work out a complete political 
conception, using both public and non-public reasons to decide between competing 
reasonable conceptions, before applying that conception within their political advocacy. 
Citizens should not move directly from their comprehensive doctrine to particular principles, 
institutions, or policies. 
 This is not to say that Rawls is definitely endorsing the Permissive Model here. One 
could argue that his use of the word ‘primarily’ is simply a concession to the fact that 
reasoning about political conceptions cannot be completely insulated from the influence of 
comprehensive doctrines. The ideal is still that it should not be affected by them. The 
‘distortion test’ would then be a test for checking that others’ political conceptions have not 
been excessively shaped by their comprehensive doctrines. Judging this based on the 
reasonableness of their conception is the best we can do. When reasoning to one’s own 
political conception, however, one should seek to use only freestanding reasons. This passage 
can therefore be read as supportive of either model. My claim is simply that it does not 
clearly rule out the Permissive Model. 
 Indeed, it is worth noting, as an aside, that I believe that Rawls’s own view on the 
relationship between citizens’ comprehensive doctrines and political conceptions within the 
Deep Version of political liberalism is unclear. While I lack space to show it here, all of his 
comments that seem relevant to our question can be plausibly read as compatible with either 
the Restrictive or Permissive Model. This is perhaps unsurprising, since Rawls’s realisation 
that there would be reasonable disagreement about justice within the well-ordered society 
came late in his turn to political liberalism, as both Gaus (2014) and Paul Weithman 
(forthcoming) emphasise. Since our question arises only within the Deep Version,
18
 it is not 






Political liberals place a high value on political deliberation. Citizens should reason together 
about prospective laws, seeking to understand others’ claims and arguments and to justify 
their own views to one another. They should also be willing to recognise the force of others’ 
arguments, and to revise their political judgments when appropriate. According to the 
deliberation objection to the Permissive Model, this kind of productive deliberation would be 
stymied by the fact that citizens accept different political conceptions based on their 
contrasting comprehensive doctrines. Citizens advocating laws will not be able to persuade 
their opponents, since the latter’s opposition is rooted in their religious and philosophical 
commitments. 
 For example, imagine that atheist Alf accepts C1, and supports law L1, which prohibits 
male-only priesthoods, on this basis. Betty will reject Alf’s public reason argument for L1, 
and will argue against it by appeal to public reasons drawn from C2. Both citizens can appeal 
to public reasons in relation to L1. Nonetheless, an advocate of the Restrictive Model can 
claim that Betty’s reliance on her comprehensive doctrine within her political reasoning 
means that there is no true basis for public deliberation here. Alf can argue that C1 is a better 
interpretation of political values than C2, and more consistent with the core idea of citizens as 
free and equal. He can argue that L1 is necessary in order for women to truly be treated as 
free and equal citizens, and that this cannot be outweighed by the value of citizens’ pursuing 
their conceptions of the good. But Berry has vetoed C2 and L1 based on her religious views, 
so is not open to such persuasion. Alf and Betty are thus left at a stalemate. 
 This objection derives its force from a mistaken assumption that every belief 
influenced by a citizen’s comprehensive doctrine is unquestionable and beyond critique. In 
reality, citizens can still challenge one another’s political conceptions, and their views on 
particular laws, under the Permissive Model. Citizens can question each other’s 
19 
interpretations and weightings of political values, both on freestanding grounds and by 
challenging the claimed connections between their political conception and comprehensive 
doctrine. Alf might argue both that the strong freestanding arguments in favour of C1 should 
cause her to favour that political conception and that Betty is incorrect to believe that her 
religious doctrine gives her reason to reject C1.
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 Betty can be open to these arguments, and 
willing to be persuaded to change her views (either political or comprehensive). 
 Comprehensive doctrines are not simply unquestionable authorities, especially when 
it comes to their political implications. Indeed, there will likely be debate among those 
holding the same comprehensive doctrine as to what political conceptions it is (in)compatible 
with. Citizens with the same religious beliefs often have widely divergent political views, and 
debate these on both religious and freestanding grounds. Citizens can be open to reasoned 
exchange, critique, and persuasion, even when their comprehensive doctrines and political 
conceptions are connected in the way the Permissive Model allows. 
Sincerity 
Many political liberals endorse a sincerity requirement, according to which citizens must 
believe that the reasons that they offer others for (or against) laws are public reasons and are 
sufficient to justify (or defeat) those laws (p. 446, Schwartzman 2011). Citizens should not 
manipulate one another, by offering reasons that they do not personally find persuasive, 
simply in order to persuade others. 
 An advocate of the Restrictive Model might argue that public deliberation under the 
Permissive Model will not be sincere. Betty objects to L1 on the basis of public reasons 
drawn from C2. She might also offer Alf a freestanding justification for C2, an argument for 
its weighting of political values that only appeals to public reasons, such as the one I outlined 
above. She can argue that L1 is objectionable on freedom of association grounds, and show 
that her political conception interprets and weighs this value in a reasonable way. However, 
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her real reasons for endorsing C2, and opposing L1, are religious. She finds the arguments for 
C2 and against L1 persuasive because of her religious beliefs, yet she presents those 
arguments to Alf as if they have sufficient independent force. This is insincere. 
 This objection is strongest in the case where Betty’s Catholicism is pivotal in her 
endorsement of C2.
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 This occurs when, counterfactually, she would have accepted C1 had 
she engaged in freestanding reasoning about political values. If she had examined competing 
political conceptions independently of her religious beliefs, then she would have considered 
C1 the most reasonable. For example, she would have concluded that all forms of 
discrimination within employment decisions violate citizens’ equal status, and that appeals to 
freedom of association cannot outweigh this fundamental political value. Instead, however, 
Betty takes her Catholic faith into account from the start, allowing it to influence her 
evaluation of competing reasonable political conceptions, and therefore accepts C2 (and its 
freestanding justification). In this case, in particular, it might seem insincere for Betty to 
present arguments based on C2 as sufficient to justify her opposition to L1. 
 Defenders of the Permissive Model can endorse the sincerity requirement, however, 
and insist that Betty’s deliberation should indeed be sincere. Betty should be open and honest 
in her deliberation with Alf, and so admit that she has religious reasons for rejecting C1 and 
favouring C2. She also accepts the freestanding justification for C2, however, and so is not 
insincere in offering that justification to Alf. She offers Alf public reasons against L1 that she 
accepts, reasons drawn from C2, and can offer a freestanding justification for C2 that she also 
accepts. She should be open about the fact that she also has religious reasons to favour C2 
over C1. 
 One might think that the strength of this response depends on whether Betty knows 
that her Catholicism is pivotal in her endorsement of C2. If she does, then she knows that had 
she first engaged in freestanding reasoning then she would have endorsed C1. It is therefore 
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insincere for her to claim that C2 is the most reasonable political conception, or to endorse its 
freestanding justification, since she really believes that C1 is the most reasonable conception, 
on purely political grounds. 
 This is mistaken, however. Betty is certainly sincere if she does not know that her 
Catholicism is pivotal, but I think she is still being sincere if she does know this. She believes 
that C2 is the most reasonable political conception, all things considered – that it is the most 
plausible and well-justified interpretation and ordering of political values, and one that 
provides reasons that all reasonable citizens can reasonably be expected to accept. Further, in 
actuality Betty does accept the freestanding justification for C2. She believes that C2 contains 
the most reasonable weighting of the political values, and that all citizens can recognise C2 as 
reasonable on freestanding grounds, and this is crucial to her own endorsement of C2. She 
would reject C2 if it could not be accepted by non-Catholics. Given that it can be, she can 
sincerely endorse C2 and its freestanding justification, and offer those arguments to Alf, while 
also acknowledging that she has further religious reasons which explain her own endorsement 
of C2 as the most reasonable political conception. She sincerely believes that L1 should not be 
enacted, and that her arguments against L1 can be accepted by all reasonable citizens. She is 
thus sincerely presenting public reasons in her political advocacy. 
Legitimacy 
A final objection to the Permissive Model is that the influence it allows comprehensive 
doctrines to have over citizens’ choice of political conception directly undermines legitimacy. 
Even if citizens within the Permissive Model endorse reasonable, complete and freestanding 
political conceptions, and can engage in sincere public deliberation, citizens’ comprehensive 
doctrines are having an undue influence over their political advocacy, and ultimately over 
political outcomes. While it is permissible for citizens to show how their comprehensive 
doctrines and political conceptions are compatible, and to express their comprehensive views 
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on political questions alongside their public reasons, public justifications should be free from 
comprehensive influence. They should only draw reasons, values and arguments that can be 
accepted by every citizen. Allowing comprehensive doctrines to shape citizens’ political 
conceptions of justice prevents this. This means that citizens do not truly fulfil the duty of 
civility. Their arguments are not truly acceptable to all citizens. Laws are thus enacted, or 
defeated, on illegitimate grounds. 
 Thus, even when Betty presents public reasons for laws, drawn from C2, she is 
offering reasons that are objectionably rooted in her comprehensive doctrine, since that 
doctrine is pivotal in her endorsement of C2. If there are many citizens like Betty who vote 
against L1, such that L1 is not enacted, then their religious views objectionably influence this 
outcome. These citizens oppose the law on the basis of a political conception that they accept 
for comprehensive reasons, so L1’s defeat has been unduly influenced by those reasons, 
undermining the central Rawlsian ambition that political decisions be made on the basis of 
reasons that all citizens can accept. 
 We can draw a further distinction here between Betty’s religion causing her (and 
others like her) to recognise the weight of the freestanding argument for C2, and Betty taking 
her religion to itself provide reasons for her to endorse C2. It might be that while she would 
have originally endorsed C1 based on freestanding reasoning, her Catholicism causes her to 
recognise weakness in the argument for C1, and that it underestimates the weight of freedom 
of association, which tells in favour of C2. In this case, her religion is helping her to recognise 
the independent weight of the public reasons in favour of C2. Alternatively, Betty might take 
her Catholicism to directly provide reasons for rejecting C1 and accepting C2, and accept the 
freestanding justification for C2 only because she already endorses that conception. In this 
case, she would cease to endorse C2 if she became an atheist, since she would cease to have 
religious reasons in its favour. Some advocates of the Restrictive Model might consider the 
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former case permissible. They would certainly object to the latter case, however, since here 
Betty’s religion is crucial to her endorsement of C2, and this threatens to undermine 
legitimacy. The Permissive Model allows both cases. 
 I do not think that this shows that we should reject the Permissive Model, however. 
Even if Betty’s Catholicism is pivotal, and even if she takes it as providing reasons in favour 
of C2, she still endorses a reasonable political conception for which there is a freestanding 
justification that she accepts and can offer Alf. The fact that she finds that justification 
plausible in part due to her already having religious reasons for C2 is a normal part of the 
process of reflective equilibrium. Comprehensive doctrines should be permitted to play the 
role within reflective equilibrium that the Permissive Model allows them to play precisely 
because citizens like Betty can fully satisfy the criterion of reciprocity, offering others 
reasons they can reasonably expect them to accept. Alf can recognise that C2 is a 
freestanding, reasonable political conception, providing public reasons for and against laws. 
He can thus accept that laws that are enacted, or defeated, by appeal to C2 are legitimate. The 
fact that some citizens endorse C2 partly based on their comprehensive doctrines does not 
undermine this. What matters is that C2 is a reasonable political conception, providing terms 
of cooperation that all citizens can reasonably be expected to endorse. 
 It is important to reemphasise here that Betty is motivated by the ideal of public 
reason. It is not the case that she just happens to end up endorsing a reasonable political 
conception, so happens to act in conformity with public reason, without actually being guided 
or motivated by that ideal. Betty endorses the ideal of public reason, and is committed to 
acting politically on the basis of a reasonable political conception, in order to offer to others 
reasons that they can reasonably be expected to endorse. If no reasonable political 
conceptions permitted male-only priesthoods then she certainly would accept a conception 
that prohibited them, and would vote in favour of prohibitive laws. She considers it vitally 
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important that there is a freestanding justification for C2, showing that all citizens can 
recognise it as reasonable, and that she accepts that justification and offers it to Alf, while 
also being open about the influence of her comprehensive doctrine. The fact that 
counterfactually she would endorse C1 instead is, in my view, neither here nor there. In 
actuality she accepts a reasonable political conception, offers a freestanding justification for 
it, and supports laws on the basis of it, so on the basis of public reasons. The influence of her 
comprehensive doctrine in her reasoning about political values does not undermine any of 
this, or prevent her from fulfilling her duty of civility. It thus does not threaten the legitimacy 
of political outcomes. 
 
Considerations in favour of the Permissive Model 
The previous section argued that the Permissive Model is fully consistent with many of the 
core values and aims of Rawlsian political liberalism. In this final section I will present two 
further considerations that count in favour of the Permissive Model: the facts that it is 
psychologically more realistic and that it can allay integrity objections to political liberalism. 
Psychological realism (and stability) 
According to the Restrictive Model, citizens’ interpretations of political values must be made 
independently of their philosophical and religious commitments. Their understanding of what 
is demanded by freedom of association, sexual equality, due respect for human life, the 
ordered reproduction of society over time, human rights, public peace, freedom of religion, 
and so on,
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 and of how these values should be weighed against one other, must be 
determined through freestanding reasoning, insulated from the influence of their 
comprehensive doctrine. It is very hard to see how this is possible. Clearly some 
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comprehensive doctrines will be silent on some of these values. Betty’s religious beliefs 
might not include any conception of what ‘public peace’ is or demands. Often, however, 
individuals’ comprehensive doctrines will include beliefs and principles that ineluctably 
guide them in their interpretation of political values. For example, a Christian’s view of what 
constitutes ‘due respect’ for human life will inevitably be influenced by his faith. As 
theologian Nigel Biggar (2011, pp. 42-43) claims, disagreement within the overlapping 
consensus will be rooted in the fact that citizens’ ‘metanarratives’ structure their 
understandings of their shared political values. The content of public reason cannot float 
entirely free of its comprehensive origins, since different metanarratives lead to different 
interpretations of the values within it.
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 It is logically possible for one to set aside all of one’s comprehensive beliefs when 
reasoning about political values and seeking to determine which interpretations best embody 
the idea of society as a fair system of cooperation between free and equal citizens. This is 
extremely demanding, however. It is not something we can expect most citizens to 
accomplish.
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 As Biggar implies, the Permissive Model is inevitable, or at least much more 
psychologically realistic. While such psychological considerations are not decisive, they are a 
relevant factor in choosing between competing accounts of legitimacy, so this gives us some 
reason to prefer the Permissive Model. 
 The work of another theologian, David Hollenbach, provides a useful example here. 
Based on his Catholic faith, Hollenbach (2002, p. 68) argues for a politics centred on ‘an 
understanding of the common good of a pluralist society,’ because the good of individuals, 
including their freedom, can only be realised through social institutions and relationships. 
‘Any good of a person that is a real good…is embedded in the good of the community. 
Conversely, any common good that is a real good is simultaneously the good of persons’ 
(Hollenbach 2002, p. 79). This might sound perfectionist, but Hollenbach’s commitment to 
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the ‘common good’ proves to amount to an endorsement of something like a Rawlsian 
conception of justice. For example, in his discussion of poverty and distributive justice he 
emphasises the need for all to have adequate resources for genuine participation in society, so 
that the basic structure embodies solidarity and reciprocity. ‘Justice calls for the minimal 
level of solidarity required to enable all of society’s members to live with basic dignity’ 
(Hollenbach 2002, p. 192). The policy implications of this include pursuing fair equality of 
opportunity and lowering structural and economic barriers that prevent the poor from sharing 
in the common good. While Hollenbach’s arguments are shaped by his religious beliefs and 
expressed in religiously-inspired language, his view of justice might well fall within the 
family of reasonable political conceptions. 
 According to Weithman (2010, pp. 323-335), Rawls’s shift to the Deep Version of 
political liberalism was in fact due to him considering such examples. Weithman presents the 
case of a ‘very fully comprehensive’ religious doctrine, which ‘includes norms, values, and 
ideals for all subjects’ including political institutions. His example is a religious view focused 
on the common good of those engaged in social forms. In political society this involves 
mutual love and tolerance.
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 This leads to a political conception that is different from justice 
as fairness, but nonetheless appears reasonable, since it supports liberal and egalitarian 
outcomes, and so endorses just institutions and basic arrangements. Adherents to this 
comprehensive doctrine desire to live up to political ideals of conduct, civic friendship and 
association contained within a reasonable political conception. Weithman argues that Rawls 
recognised that this kind of very fully comprehensive religious doctrine endorses a reasonable 
political conception different to justice as fairness, and this is why he moved to speaking of a 
family of reasonable conceptions. 
 This argument presupposes the Permissive Model. Adherents of the religious doctrine 
endorse a political conception that is directly derived from their religious beliefs, but is also 
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part of the family of reasonable conceptions. Weithman does not suggest that those accepting 
this doctrine must set it aside and reason in a freestanding way to a political conception. 
Instead, as long as the conception they derive from their religion is reasonable, they are 
permitted to base their political advocacy upon it. 
 Importantly, Weithman also argues that this is consistent with Political Liberalism’s 
stability argument. All citizens endorse a reasonable political conception and want to live up 
to its values and ideals as long as others do, so all acting upon their conception of justice is a 
Nash equilibrium. An overlapping consensus on the family of reasonable political 
conceptions creates a stable well-ordered society, even when at least some citizens’ 
endorsement of their conception is directly influenced by their comprehensive doctrine. For 
Weithman, therefore, the Permissive Model can fulfil what he believes to be Rawls’s central 
purpose in Political Liberalism. 
Integrity 
The Permissive Model also has one final benefit, which I mentioned in my introduction: it 
defuses many of the integrity concerns pressed by opponents of political liberalism. Biggar’s 
claim about citizens’ metanarratives shaping their understanding of shared political values is 
not merely about psychological realism. More importantly, it points to the fact that many 
citizens consider this to be a part of their comprehensive commitments, so believe they are 
morally obligated to base their understanding of political justice on their comprehensive 
doctrine (Wolterstorff 1997, p. 105).
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 The Permissive Model allows them to do so, rather 
than requiring them to engage in a form of freestanding reasoning that they would consider 
an objectionable strain on their integrity. Citizens are encouraged to have an ‘integrated 
existence’, while remaining within the constraints of public reason. 
 Of course, those constraints mean that the Permissive Model still demands that 
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citizens give up any ambitions to comprehensively structure laws and institutions on the basis 
of their comprehensive doctrine. Citizens must also exercise restraint, refraining from 
supporting laws for which their only reasons are non-public. Citizens will sometimes have 
comprehensive reasons in favour of laws that their political conception cannot justify. The 
duty of civility demands that they do not seek the enactment of such laws. This is the cost of 
living in a free, pluralistic, society. But it is a cost that many citizens will be willing to pay, 
and falls far short of the gross restrictions on religious freedom that some critics have accused 
Rawls of endorsing. The Permissive Model is consistent with reasonable religious citizens 
living a religiously integrated life, in a way that the Restrictive Model is not, precisely 
because it allows them to base their understanding of political values upon their 
comprehensive beliefs. 
Conclusion 
The move to the Deep Version of political liberalism, which acknowledges reasonable 
disagreement about justice, not only about the good, opens up new questions about the 
relationship between citizens’ comprehensive doctrines and their political conceptions of 
justice that have been inadequately explored by Rawlsians thus far. In this paper I have 
presented two models of this relationship and argued that Rawlsians should accept the 
Permissive Model. 
 These two models are of course ideal-types, and some theorists might consider the 
Restrictive Model too restrictive, while also remaining sceptical about some of the forms of 
reasoning permitted by the Permissive Model. I believe that Rawlsians should fully embrace 
the Permissive Model, however. This model achieves Rawls’s central purpose – providing an 
account of how a stable and just society of free and equal citizens, living together on fair 
terms of cooperation by enacting laws acceptable to all, is possible in a pluralistic democracy. 
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Being clear that they endorse this model might also mean that Rawlsians win over some of 
their critics, especially those who have considered political liberalism too restrictive of 
religious belief in public life. 
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Notes 
1. For discussion, see Boettcher (2005), Neal (2009). 
2. ‘Constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice’. Rawls restricts the scope of public 
reason to these areas. All references to ‘laws’ should be taken to mean laws that fall within the 
limited domain. Some political liberals reject this restriction of scope. For example, see Quong 
(2011, pp. 273-289). I will not discuss that debate here. The question I discuss in this paper 
applies whether one endorses a broad or narrow scope. 
3. As is hopefully clear, I am taking the Rawlsian framework as given for the purposes of this 
paper. 
4. All unattributed page numbers in this article refer to Rawls (2005). This version of Political 
liberalism includes ‘The idea of public reason revisited’. 
5. Importantly, this is not simple pluralism but reasonable pluralism – a result of citizens’ 
exercises of practical reason (pp. 36-37). 
6. It is important to note that when political liberals speak of ‘citizens’, they usually mean this to 
refer to agents who are ‘idealised’ in various ways. While I am agnostic here about what kinds 
of idealisation are and are not appropriate, all references to ‘citizens’ in this paper should be 
taken as referring to agents who are idealised in the appropriate ways. 
7. At minimum, no reasonable comprehensive doctrine conflicts ‘too sharply’ (p. 40) with the 
political conception. 
8. Quong’s (2011, pp. 180-187) ‘alternative view’ of the overlapping consensus sees every 
reasonable political conception as an interpretation of the three general principles. Rawls 
simply requires that every conception contain these three principles, alongside other political 
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values. 
9. For Rawls, this is justice as fairness. Justice as fairness itself is perhaps not a single, well-
defined, political conception, however. There are several plausible interpretations of its 
principles. For instance, primary goods can be weighed against each other in different ways. 
These differences can have important policy implications (Van Parijs 2003). 
10. i.e. the exercise of political power is ‘fully proper’ (p. 137). This is a lower standard than 
justice, but a related one (pp. 427-428). 
11. Quong’s view of the overlapping consensus is a version of the Restrictive Model, but could be 
amended to fit with the Permissive Model. For criticism of Quong’s view, see Zoffoli (2012). 
12. This points to a third model, under which citizens must form a political conception in a 
freestanding way, but can then move to a different conception if they find that it fits better with 
their comprehensive doctrine. It is likely that the political conception a citizen moves to in this 
case will be close to the first conception, so the stage of freestanding reasoning is still 
independently important. In effect, a citizen would narrow down to a subset of reasonable 
conceptions based on freestanding reasoning, and comprehensive considerations would then 
determine the precise conception she accepts. While this is a distinct model, it is closer to the 
Permissive Model in terms of its implications for the relationship between political conceptions 
and comprehensive doctrines. The arguments for and against the Permissive Model also apply 
to this third model, which seems to be endorsed by Macedo (2010). 
13. If you consider this implausible then feel free to replace the example with an equivalent of your 
own. I sketch arguments for this claim later in the paper. 
14. I am not endorsing this argument. My claim is simply that it appears reasonable, not that it is 
necessarily correct, or the best understanding of political values. 
15. Or some other reasonable political conception that permits male-only priesthoods. 
16. An even more permissive model could hold that it does not matter whether Betty accepts the 
freestanding justification for C2, as long as such a justification exists (and, perhaps, that she 
knows this), so that C2 is a reasonable political conception, providing public reasons. I think 
that Rawls would reject this model, however, due to his views of freestandingness, 
completeness, and publicity. My ‘Permissive Model’ is the most permissive that Rawls would 
allow. 
17. I was first led to think about the issues explored in this paper by a discussion between Kevin 
Vallier and Micah Schwartzman on the Public Reason blog: 
http://publicreason.net/2012/11/26/brettschneider-reading-group-chapter-5-religious-freedom-
and-the-reasons-for-rights/. Schwartzman cites this passage as the key evidence for his view 
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that Rawls favoured the Restrictive Model. 
18. The Shallow Version only allows for the Restrictive Model. All reasonable citizens accept the 
same political conception, so a citizen’s comprehensive doctrine cannot affect her choice of 
conception. 
19. Having said this, I think that the trajectory of Rawls’s thought, along with several of the 
pertinent comments in ‘Revisited’, means that he would endorse the Permissive Model. I lack 
space to defend this exegetical claim here. 
20. This has clear similarities to ‘reasoning from conjecture’ (pp. 465-466), on which see 
Schwartzman (2012). 
21. I am indebted to Matthew Clayton and Adam Swift for discussion of the points in the following 
paragraphs. 
22. This list of political values is formed using Rawls’s own examples (pp. 243, fn. 32; 474; 480, 
fn. 82). 
23. Hollenbach (2002, pp. 166-168) makes a somewhat similar argument. 
24. Indeed, forming a complete political conception and applying it consistently across all 
fundamental political questions is itself very demanding. 
25. This is reminiscent of Hollenbach’s view. 
26. Hollenbach’s work is again a pertinent example. 
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